What do we do, I wonder, with narratives such as Tulku Orgyen's Blazing Splendor which speak of many of Chogyur Lingpa's 19th century gong ter being revealed quite openly before independent spectators, as well as stories of paranormal encounters with mountain lha in human guise, and literal descriptions of the gong ter objects which appear to usually be a psychic summary that the Terton has to physically extract, interpret, and codify for use.
In Blazing Splendor this is frequently a case of the author talking directly to first hand witnesses, who are not "visionaries" themselves, and not the retelling of stories at second or third hand.
The histories written in Tibet are entirely different in principle and function from modern Western history.
Similarly, would you say the same of Islamic histories or Jewish histories or Greek histories? Al of these are have a "function" to inspire or motivate. Aren't fairy tales and such the same? So why attach the word "history" or the word "truth"? Well, I think that is obvious, "history" and "truth" deceive and motivate far better than "myth", "fable" or such.
And when discussing "visionary history", are we to count Joseph's Smith's book of Mormon also "visionary history" with the same generosity you afford Tibetan texts? Should we just pay attention to their principle and function? Sure, if we want to understand Mormons, I could see how such a phenomonlogical view is useful and how it is essential if we want to be Mormon or very close to Mormons. [BTW, I like most Mormons I have ever met -- and have many very personal experiences with them. So not a cut on Mormons here.]
It seems that you are agreeing with David Germano in that you are proposing that it is 'useful' to be forgiving of truth, if you want to get inside someone's head. Or some culture's head -- I agree, and have done this several times in my life.
But your last paragraphs seem to imply that there lies a space where some 'visionary truths' are revealed to the listener which model very useful constructs to build real truth -- benzene models, for instance. But then this implies that Hebrew visionary models of Yaheweh may have mythical quality but teach us something very real which we must respect. Same for Joseph Smith.
It is the flavor of the analogies and the use of vocabulary that seems to give a mixed message. I was hoping you could clarify.
For finally, after centuries of "truths" deceiving people, the naked King is being revealed. As we have developed tools to try to be more accurate in describing what is really happening, we don't want to throw away the baby with the wash, but we don't want to keep the nasty wash, either.
would you say the same of Islamic histories or Jewish histories or Greek histories?
Not sure I know enough about those to say, but probably yes.
are we to count Joseph's Smith's book of Mormon also "visionary history" with the same generosity you afford Tibetan texts?
Sure, why not?
we don't want to throw away the baby with the wash, but we don't want to keep the nasty wash, either.
Yup, I agree. I'll be washing a lot of dirty Tibetan laundry in public on my Wordpress blog soon.
I.e. I will discuss the politics of Tibetan religious history without pulling my punches too much.
I guess I'm not sure what you are looking for here. Maybe my point is that when religious claims are non-empirical, they can't be evaluated empirically.
This is more or less the "non-overlapping magisteria" approach (NOMA). As long as the magisteria don't overlap, then they don't contradict.
I gather that the standard objection to NOMA is that religions do make empirical claims. In those cases, I think they need to be evaluated empirically. Contrariwise, from the little I have read of the recent attempts to naturalize religious claims, I think they may be an illegitimate incursion of empiricism into the other magisterium.
Good answer, David. I get your position and agree. I run into far too many religious folks that do indeed make empirical claims constantly and often based on a factual history. They are often naughty and step out of their magisteria. Smile
Thank you
Let's take it out of the Tibetan and the religious context for a moment and consider two questions: Did Betsy Ross design the American flag? and Did Thomas Jefferson write the Declaration of Independence?
Neither of these questions have "empirical", "scientific", or "objective" answers because both describe unique and non-repeatable events in the past. All we have for either of them is the evidence of written testimony by outside observers, which is inherently subject to some degree of doubt in all cases. Observers can be mistaken, they can be deceived, or they can say what they do not believe. And there is no way to totally eliminate any of these alternatives for any written testimony.
The standard of belief in the study of history is exactly that of the standard of a verdict in a civil trial: "the preponderance of the of the evidence" and not "beyond a reasonable doubt". As of now, the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Betsy Ross didn't and Thomas Jefferson did. But since there is always a degree of doubt about any testimony, the verdict is still subject to revision in the light of new evidence.
Now consider two other questions: "Was the design of the American flag derived from elements in George Washington's coat of arms?" and "Was the Declaration of Independence inspired by God?" Both of these questions are beyond any standard of either "the preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt" since they are wholly internal, either internal to the text itself or internal to the designer and the author. Even the testimony of Betsy Ross or Thomas Jefferson would not be adequate evidence to answer these questions, since there is no way to independently reduce doubts about it. Further, the mere facts that GW's arms bears five pointed stars and the Declaration refers to "God given rights" is not testimony either for or against the questions--they are merely facts which suggest them. And the sensible historical stance toward either is the Scotch Verdict of "not proven", with the implicit understanding that they may also be "not provable".
This is basically the same verdict that should be drawn about Padmasambhava's "authorship" of termas--it is both "not proven" and "not provable" one way or the other, therefore moot. There simply is no independent testimony available. Much of this visionary "dilemma" is merely an artifact of confusing the text with the event of it's authorship. The "text" is what is written by the terton, in, say, 1654, and [redundantly] only written by the terton, since Guru Rinpoche was not around to write it. A text can either be written by an author or a stenographer, and no testimony inside the text is adequate proof of either alternative.
Historically, the authorship of terma by Guru Rinpoche is no more provable one way or the other than the Divine Inspiration of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, historically, it is a pseudo-problem. The only "objective" history of a terma which can be established is the emergence of the literal text and the later response of people to it. For that history it is sufficient to merely describe the belief [if it exists] that the terma was written by Guru Rinpoche. In fact, that is only what can be described.
All the rest of it is a priori reasoning from an exterior [and historically irrelevant] philosophical point of view, whether Materialist or Buddhist, Tibetan or Western. The "history" of any paranormal event is not "whether it really happened" but whether the people present believed it to have happened and said so. To say anything else is a radical confusion of totally separate categories of thought.
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Terma History
24 Mar 2011
What do we do, I wonder, with narratives such as Tulku Orgyen's Blazing Splendor which speak of many of Chogyur Lingpa's 19th century gong ter being revealed quite openly before independent spectators, as well as stories of paranormal encounters with mountain lha in human guise, and literal descriptions of the gong ter objects which appear to usually be a psychic summary that the Terton has to physically extract, interpret, and codify for use.
In Blazing Splendor this is frequently a case of the author talking directly to first hand witnesses, who are not "visionaries" themselves, and not the retelling of stories at second or third hand.
Mormon & Hebrew "Visionary Truth"
9 Feb 2012
@ David :
You said
Similarly, would you say the same of Islamic histories or Jewish histories or Greek histories? Al of these are have a "function" to inspire or motivate. Aren't fairy tales and such the same? So why attach the word "history" or the word "truth"? Well, I think that is obvious, "history" and "truth" deceive and motivate far better than "myth", "fable" or such.
And when discussing "visionary history", are we to count Joseph's Smith's book of Mormon also "visionary history" with the same generosity you afford Tibetan texts? Should we just pay attention to their principle and function? Sure, if we want to understand Mormons, I could see how such a phenomonlogical view is useful and how it is essential if we want to be Mormon or very close to Mormons. [BTW, I like most Mormons I have ever met -- and have many very personal experiences with them. So not a cut on Mormons here.]
It seems that you are agreeing with David Germano in that you are proposing that it is 'useful' to be forgiving of truth, if you want to get inside someone's head. Or some culture's head -- I agree, and have done this several times in my life.
But your last paragraphs seem to imply that there lies a space where some 'visionary truths' are revealed to the listener which model very useful constructs to build real truth -- benzene models, for instance. But then this implies that Hebrew visionary models of Yaheweh may have mythical quality but teach us something very real which we must respect. Same for Joseph Smith.
It is the flavor of the analogies and the use of vocabulary that seems to give a mixed message. I was hoping you could clarify.
For finally, after centuries of "truths" deceiving people, the naked King is being revealed. As we have developed tools to try to be more accurate in describing what is really happening, we don't want to throw away the baby with the wash, but we don't want to keep the nasty wash, either.
Visionary history
9 Feb 2012
Not sure I know enough about those to say, but probably yes.
Sure, why not?
Yup, I agree. I'll be washing a lot of dirty Tibetan laundry in public on my Wordpress blog soon.
I.e. I will discuss the politics of Tibetan religious history without pulling my punches too much.
I guess I'm not sure what you are looking for here. Maybe my point is that when religious claims are non-empirical, they can't be evaluated empirically.
This is more or less the "non-overlapping magisteria" approach (NOMA). As long as the magisteria don't overlap, then they don't contradict.
I gather that the standard objection to NOMA is that religions do make empirical claims. In those cases, I think they need to be evaluated empirically. Contrariwise, from the little I have read of the recent attempts to naturalize religious claims, I think they may be an illegitimate incursion of empiricism into the other magisterium.
The Magisteria Clause
9 Feb 2012
Good answer, David. I get your position and agree. I run into far too many religious folks that do indeed make empirical claims constantly and often based on a factual history. They are often naughty and step out of their magisteria. Smile
Thank you
Let's take it out of the
10 Feb 2012
Let's take it out of the Tibetan and the religious context for a moment and consider two questions: Did Betsy Ross design the American flag? and Did Thomas Jefferson write the Declaration of Independence?
Neither of these questions have "empirical", "scientific", or "objective" answers because both describe unique and non-repeatable events in the past. All we have for either of them is the evidence of written testimony by outside observers, which is inherently subject to some degree of doubt in all cases. Observers can be mistaken, they can be deceived, or they can say what they do not believe. And there is no way to totally eliminate any of these alternatives for any written testimony.
The standard of belief in the study of history is exactly that of the standard of a verdict in a civil trial: "the preponderance of the of the evidence" and not "beyond a reasonable doubt". As of now, the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Betsy Ross didn't and Thomas Jefferson did. But since there is always a degree of doubt about any testimony, the verdict is still subject to revision in the light of new evidence.
Now consider two other questions: "Was the design of the American flag derived from elements in George Washington's coat of arms?" and "Was the Declaration of Independence inspired by God?" Both of these questions are beyond any standard of either "the preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt" since they are wholly internal, either internal to the text itself or internal to the designer and the author. Even the testimony of Betsy Ross or Thomas Jefferson would not be adequate evidence to answer these questions, since there is no way to independently reduce doubts about it. Further, the mere facts that GW's arms bears five pointed stars and the Declaration refers to "God given rights" is not testimony either for or against the questions--they are merely facts which suggest them. And the sensible historical stance toward either is the Scotch Verdict of "not proven", with the implicit understanding that they may also be "not provable".
This is basically the same verdict that should be drawn about Padmasambhava's "authorship" of termas--it is both "not proven" and "not provable" one way or the other, therefore moot. There simply is no independent testimony available. Much of this visionary "dilemma" is merely an artifact of confusing the text with the event of it's authorship. The "text" is what is written by the terton, in, say, 1654, and [redundantly] only written by the terton, since Guru Rinpoche was not around to write it. A text can either be written by an author or a stenographer, and no testimony inside the text is adequate proof of either alternative.
Historically, the authorship of terma by Guru Rinpoche is no more provable one way or the other than the Divine Inspiration of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, historically, it is a pseudo-problem. The only "objective" history of a terma which can be established is the emergence of the literal text and the later response of people to it. For that history it is sufficient to merely describe the belief [if it exists] that the terma was written by Guru Rinpoche. In fact, that is only what can be described.
All the rest of it is a priori reasoning from an exterior [and historically irrelevant] philosophical point of view, whether Materialist or Buddhist, Tibetan or Western. The "history" of any paranormal event is not "whether it really happened" but whether the people present believed it to have happened and said so. To say anything else is a radical confusion of totally separate categories of thought.
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